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Introduction and Summary
introduction
Behavioral Social Choice Research
This book develops conceptual, mathematical, methodological, and em-
pirical foundations of behavioral social choice research. Behavioral social
choice research (or, more brieﬂy, behavioral social choice) encompasses
two major interconnected paradigms: the development of behavioral so-
cial choice theory and the evaluation of that theory with empirical data
on social choice behavior.
The fundamental purpose of a behavioral theory of social choice pro-
cesses is the development of descriptive models for real actors’ social
choice behavior and the statistical evaluation of such models against em-
pirical data.Our notion of behavioral social choice research builds on and,
at the same time, complementsmuch of classical social choice theory in the
tradition of leading ﬁgures such as the Marquis de Condorcet, Duncan
Black, Kenneth Arrow, and Amartya Sen. Most classic approaches fol-
low an axiomatic, normative line of reasoning. They formulate desirable
properties of “rational” social choice and provide numerous “possibility”
or “impossibility” theorems that classify groups of such axioms into
whether or not they lead to ‘feasible’ aggregation procedures, given vari-
ous theoretical assumptions about the nature, domain, and distribution of
individual preferences (McLean and Urken, 1995). A principal task of be-
havioral social choice research is to evaluate such normative benchmarks
of rational social choice against empirical evidence on real world social
choice behavior. Consistently throughout this bookwe attempt to evaluate
1
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2 Introduction and Summary
our models against a wide range of empirical evidence drawn from large-
scale real-world data sets from three different countries. To the extent that
classical/normative theories fail to be descriptive of observed social choice
behavior, they motivate and inspire the development of (alternative) be-
havioral theories that complement classical approaches by descriptively
capturing the social choice behavior of real actors.
We see our work as building on the pioneering literature that inte-
grates formal models with the analysis of real world social choice data
(e.g., Chamberlin et al., 1984; Felsenthal et al., 1986, 1993; Felsenthal and
Machover, 1995; Laver and Schoﬁeld, 1990; Niemi, 1970; Riker, 1958).
We provide a general probabilistic modeling and statistical sampling and
inference framework for the descriptive theoretical and empirical inves-
tigation of social choice behavior of real-world decision makers, but we
place a major emphasis on majority rule decision making (Condorcet,
1785). Our general framework is formulated in terms of an extremely
broad domain of permissible preference representations and it is applica-
ble to an extremely broad range of empirical rating, ranking, and choice
paradigms.
Six Major Contributions
While we conceptualize behavioral social choice theory as encompassing
a very broad spectrum of research paradigms,1 we focus here exclusively
on the foundations for such a theory. Our main contributions are sixfold:
1. We argue for the limited theoretical relevance and demonstrate the
lack of empirical evidence for cycles in mass electorates by replac-
ing “value restriction”2 and similar classic domain restriction con-
ditions, as well as the “impartial culture” assumption, with more
realistic assumptions about preference distributions.
2. We expand the classical domains of permissible preference states by
allowing for more general binary preference relations than linear
or weak orders and by considering probabilistic representations of
preference and utility.
3. We develop methodologies to (re)construct preference distributions
from incomplete data, that is, data which do not provide either
complete rankings or complete sets of pairwise comparisons.
1 For example, in addition to the study of committee voting and mass election processes,
we see behavioral social choice theory as encompassing the empirical study of coalitions,
of information pooling (such as occurs in juries), and of a wide variety of other collective
choice processes.
2 A deﬁnition of this (and related) terms is provided later in the text.
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4. We highlight the dependence of social choice results on assumed
models of preference or utility.
5. We develop a statistical sampling and Bayesian inference frame-
work that usually places tight upper and lower bounds on the prob-
ability of any majority preference relation (cycle or not).
6. We demonstrate that in situations where sampling may be involved,
misestimation (i.e., erroneous evaluation) of the majority prefer-
ences is a far greater (and much more probable) threat to demo-
cratic decision making than majority cycles.
Conceptually, our work is heavily inﬂuenced by the foundations of
behavioral economics and behavioral decision theory (see, e.g., Akerlof,
1984; Allais, 1953; Camerer et al., 2004; Harless and Camerer, 1994;
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman et al., 1982; Luce, 1992, 2000;
Luce and Suppes, 1965; Luce and vonWinterfeldt, 1994; Plott and Levine,
1978; Shleifer, 2000; Simon, 1955; Smith, 1976, 1994; Suppes, 1961;
Thaler, 1993a,b; Tversky, 1969; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1981).
Similar to much theoretical work in those ﬁelds, our approach to be-
havioral social choice theory is descriptive, yet mathematically formal.
Also, like those ﬁelds, our approach draws theoretically, conceptually, and
methodologically on mathematical psychology and statistics. In particu-
lar, we seek to build upon the early integrative perspective to the decision
sciences of two outstanding theorists, Duncan Luce and Patrick Suppes
(see esp. Luce and Suppes, 1965).
We recognize that, by concentrating on foundational work here, we
omit other important and, in our opinion, ‘higher order’ aspects of a
full-ﬂedged behavioral theory, such as issues of strategic behavior that
are so central to much ongoing work on social choice.3 While we do not
investigate the behavioral ramiﬁcations of game theoretic models here, we
do believe that future descriptive work on strategic social choice behavior
can build on the general foundations that we lay here.
We now brieﬂy elaborate on our six major contributions.
1 Majority Cycles in a New Light. Majority rule has played an impor-
tant role in the history of social choice theory. We believe it is fair to say
that majority rule continues to be broadly viewed as the most important
(or at least most inﬂuential) benchmark of rational social choice, while at
the same time being put into question by important theoretical classical
3 Since most of our data analyses use survey data on mass electorates, we do not believe that
our substantive empirical conclusions are likely to be affected by our implicit assumption
that the data are sincere reﬂections of the voter preferences.
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work. In particular, our work complements three major theoretical devel-
opments in classical social choice theory that bear heavily on the study
of majority rule decision making: Arrow’s impossibility theorem and two
subsequent strands of research that were motivated by Arrow’s result,
namely the literature on domain restrictions and the literature that draws
on the impartial culture assumption.
arrow’s theorem and cycles. Arrow’s famous “impossibility the-
orem” (1951) eliminates majority rule because one can easily construct
hypothetical preference distributions under which majority rule violates
one of Arrow’s axioms, namely transitivity.4 (However, see Saari’s recent
work, 1999, 2001b, 2001c for a novel theoretical perspective on Arrow’s
theorem and on majority cycles in particular.) In fact, the possibility of
majority cycles continues to be a major reason why so many social choice
scholars (and those inﬂuenced by them) argue that majority rule decision
making is ﬂawed. Yet, Arrow’s approach requires an ideal social choice
procedure to satisfy a certain set of axioms under all possible distributions
of preferences (i.e., all possible preference proﬁles) over a given domain
of possible preferences states, and proves that such a procedure fails to
exist.5 Behavioral social choice research can bring a new perspective to
Arrow’s theorem if it demonstrates that actual (voting) data are such that
majority rule is overwhelmingly transitive. One interpretation of such
an empirical result is that, for real data, one does not need to assume
Arrow’s condition that the social welfare function (choice procedure) is
deﬁned over all possible voter proﬁles. To phrase it differently, in this ap-
proach the feasibility of Arrow’s ideal is no longer a theoretical question
alone, but rather it becomes primarily an empirical and pragmatic one. If
we take the pragmatic view that democratic decision making needs to be
feasible only for actual preference distributions observed in the real world
(i.e., the domain of the social choice function consists only of those distri-
butions that have actually been observed), rather than for all conceivable
4 The simplest example of the paradox of cyclical majorities, also called the “Condorcet
paradox,” occurs with three voters choosing among three alternatives. Label the alterna-
tives as A, B, and C, assume that voter 1 has preference order ABC, voter 2 has preference
order BCA and voter 3 has preference order CAB. Then majorities prefer A to B and B
to C, which might lead us to expect that a majority prefers A to C. But this is not the
case. Instead, a majority prefers C to A, and therefore these majority preferences form a
cycle, i.e., group preferences are not transitive even though the individual preferences are
transitive.
5 One can avoid the impossibility result either by generalizing the approach to nondeter-
ministicmethods, leading to a probabilistic dictator (Pattanaik and Peleg, 1986; Tangiane,
1991), or by considering an inﬁnite set of voters (Fishburn, 1970a).
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distributions, then majority rule remains a strong contender to Arrow’s
challenge. In this book, we consider a number of real world preference
distributions and ﬁnd no conclusive empirical evidence that would sub-
stantiate the existence of majority cycles. One of our theoretical aims is
thus to develop descriptively adequate constraints on preference distri-
butions that explain the absence of majority cycles, that is, to answer
Gordon Tullock’s (1981) question “Why so much stability?”
domain restrictions and cycles. The literature on domain re-
strictions such as Sen’s “value restriction” and Black’s “single peakedness”
(Black, 1958; Sen, 1966, 1970; see Ga¨rtner, 2001, for a nice overview of
that and related work) studies ways in which the domain of feasible in-
dividual preferences can be constrained in such a way that, for example,
majority cycles are eliminated, regardless of the distribution of preferences
over that restricted domain. Behavioral social choice research places a pre-
mium on the analysis of real world data. We present and analyze survey
data from national election studies in three countries.6 Although we dis-
cuss noteworthy exceptions that have to do with extremely homogenous
national subpopulations, we ﬁnd these empirical distributions to violate
every imaginable domain restriction condition because of the fact that
every permissible preference state (say, strict weak order) is reported by a
very large number of respondents. Therefore, in our approach, rather than
restricting the domain of permissible preferences, we restrict the distribu-
tion of preferences (and, in fact, vastly enlarge the domain of permissible
preferences). We expect that in general, at least for mass electorates, every
preference state that a voter is allowed to report will be reported by some
(and possibly many) voters, no matter how ‘strange’ or ‘irrational’ we
might consider that preference state to be. Nonetheless, we also expect
that the distribution of such preference states will be such that majority
rule is transitive.
the impartial culture and cycles. The literature on the impar-
tial culture and related distributions (DeMeyer and Plott, 1970; Gehrlein
and Fishburn, 1976b; Gehrlein and Lepelley, 1999, 2001; Jones et al.,
1995; Klahr, 1966) investigates the probability that majority rule leads to
a cycle, when preferences are randomly sampled from a given probability
distribution over a given domain of permissible preferences, as one varies
6 We refer to the distributions of choices (votes) in these surveys as “realistic” because, while
they are likely to closely resemble the actual population distributions that the surveys were
drawn from, our arguments hold without having to claim that the surveys accurately
reﬂect the exact distribution of preferences in all details.
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the number of candidates and/or the number of voters. An impartial cul-
ture is a uniform distribution over linear or weak orders and consists,
itself, of a complete majority tie among all candidates. We call such dis-
tributions cultures of indifference. While random samples drawn from
cultures of ndifference generate majority cycles with high probability, we
show that samples drawn from any other culture will have majority cycles
with probability approaching zero as the sample size increases, unless the
culture itself has a cycle built in. One of the policy reversals suggested
by this change of perspective is that high turnout (not, as is commonly
claimed, low turnout) is desirable when using majority rule. In our em-
pirical work, we show that none of our empirical preference distributions
even remotely resembles a random sample from an impartial culture.7
Classical approaches fail to describe empirical data on preference distri-
butions for mass electorates, and are often construed as suggesting overly
pessimistic policy implications regarding the feasibility of democratic de-
cision making. To summarize our discussion of cycles in somewhat sim-
plistic terms, all three sets of results, Arrow’s theorem, Sen’s value restric-
tion, and the impartial culture assumption, place constraints that are too
strong, each in its own way. Arrow requires a procedure that not only
‘works’ in practice, but that ‘works’ under all conceivable circumstances.
Sen’s value restriction and similar domain restrictions rule out preference
states that will invariably be held by some large number of people.8 The
impartial culture requires extreme symmetry on the distribution of pref-
erences and the slightest violation of that symmetry completely upsets
the policy implications one would draw. We believe that a behaviorally
adequate theory of majority rule requires an extremely broad domain of
permissible preference states and a descriptively adequate theory of real-
world preference distributions, as well as adequate probabilistic modeling
and statistical analysis tools to investigate empirical data. Much of this
book is dedicated to that task. In particular, we replace classical assump-
tions by conditions stated in terms of “net preferences” over a very broad
domain of permissible preferences to obtain results (in particular, about
cycles) that we consider much more behaviorally realistic and that fare
well in their evaluation against empirical data.
2 Generalizing Majority Rule. Our behavioral approach dictates that
we reach beyond the deterministic linear or weak order individual
7 None of them looks like a random sample from an intransitive culture either.
8 In particular, we conjecture that such observations cannot simply be attributed to mea-
surement error or other noise.
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preferences, commonly assumed in classical theories, to include a broad
range of mathematical representations of preference or utility that have
been proposed and used in the decision sciences.
The various representations of “preference” that have been studied in
the decision sciences include linear,weak, partial orders and semiorders, as
well as probability distributions over such orders. All of these are special
cases of binary relations and probability distributions over binary rela-
tions. Most mathematical representations of “utility” (as opposed to pref-
erence) rely on real-valued functions that map objects into their (possibly
vector-valued) utility values. A very general conceptual framework to rep-
resent and quantify the variability of utilities is provided by random utility
theory. Here, the utility of an object is (the value of) a random variable (or
a random vector). Preference relations are in close correspondence with
utility functions, and probability distributions over preference relations
are in close correspondence with utility random variables, that is, random
utility models. Just as probability distributions over preference relations
generalize and include deterministic preference relations, so do random
utilities generalize and include real-valued deterministic utility functions.
In this book we formulate and investigate majority rule (for ﬁnitely many
candidates/choice alternatives) in terms of arbitrary binary preference re-
lations, probabilistic binary preference relations, arbitrary real (possibly
vector) valued utility functions, and arbitrary real (possibly vector) val-
ued random utility representations. In so doing, we integrate deterministic
with probabilistic representations of preference, andwe allow formultiple
possible representations of utility, including random utility models.
We make no assumptions about where the randomness comes from.
Probabilities may capture random error, random sampling, probabilistic
mechanisms inside the decision maker’s head, or they may simply quan-
tify the ‘proportion’ of the population that satisﬁes some property. In par-
ticular, we require no independence assumptions. Since people interact
and communicate, we allow individual preferences to be interdependent
and/or systematically biased in the following sense: In a probability dis-
tribution over preference relations, interdependencies can be quantiﬁed
through setting the probabilities of certain preference orders very high or
very low; in the random utility framework, the interdependent nature of
utilities is captured and quantiﬁed through the joint distribution of the
utility random variables. We also make no assumptions about that joint
distribution.
Our very general and unifying mathematical framework also estab-
lishes a close link between social choice theory and the other areas of the
decision sciences, especially individual choice theory. Furthermore, this
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approach allows us to derive results at a level of mathematical generality
that includes and combines many known social choice theoretic results as
special cases of a much broader framework.
3 (Re)constructing Preference Distributions. We argue that majority rule
decision making has received limited empirical investigation because
hardly any empirical data provide the input that is technically required
to compute majority rule outcomes. Therefore, ‘empirical’ majority out-
comes are usually hypothetical in nature to the extent that their computa-
tion from most available data requires various simplifying assumptions.
We use a probabilistic approach to the measurement and inference of pref-
erence distributions from incomplete and/or randomly sampled empirical
data in such a fashion as to encompass a multitude of empirical choice,
rating, and ranking paradigms. In particular, our approach allows us to
use the kinds of ballot data that are available from many real elections
(e.g., plurality bloc voting, the single transferable vote, the alternative
vote, and approval voting) and the kinds of data that are frequently col-
lected in surveys (e.g., thermometer ratings and proximity data in national
election studies) to make inferences about the distribution of underlying
preferences. We illustrate our general approach with a particular empha-
sis on “feeling thermometer” survey data and on “approval voting” (i.e.,
“subset choice”) election ballot data.
4 Model Dependence. We discuss the fundamental problem of model de-
pendence of social choice results. As mentioned above, theoretical results
aboutmajority rule outcomesmay dramatically change as onemoves from
one model of preferences and their distributions to another. For instance,
our theoretical view of behaviorally appropriate domains of preference
relations and preference distributions minimizes the likelihood of cycles
and reverses a common policy recommendation about voter turnout. In
the empirical domain we show how the analysis of empirical data may
crucially depend on the implicit or explicit modeling assumptions that
enter the analysis. When we analyze the same set of data with multiple
competing models, we ﬁnd that the inferred preferences and preference
distributions can be dramatically different across models. Nonetheless, by
and large, the nature of the majority preference relation is not dramati-
cally affected. Moreover, virtually all our analyses of all data sets in this
book share the common conclusion that majority preferences are transi-
tive. (The exceptional analyses, i.e., those that do not rule out a cycle, do
not provide strong evidence for the presence of a cycle either.)
© Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org
Cambridge University Press
0521829682 - Behavioral Social Choice: Probabilistic Models, Statistical Inference, and
Applications




5 AGeneral Sampling and Inference Framework. Classical social choice
theory relies on statistics largely in work on sampling from the impartial
culture or other cultures of indifference. We develop a statistical sampling
and Bayesian inference framework for the theoretical and empirical in-
vestigation of majority rule decision making in samples drawn from prac-
tically any distribution over any family of binary relations (over ﬁnitely
many candidates). This allows us to place upper and lower bounds on the
probability of any majority outcome (cycle or not) in a sample given al-
most any population, or in the population given almost any sample. Our
method provides, by and large, very tight bounds on these probabilities. In
particular, it allows us to place tight bounds on the probability of a cycle
in a fashion that reaches far beyond the traditional cultures of indifference
used in classical sampling work. More importantly, using this method, as
long as we know the pairwise preference margins among each pair of
candidates in a random sample, we can place upper and lower bounds
on the probability of any conceivable majority preference relation in the
population from which this sample was drawn. We believe that this con-
stitutes a major milestone in our ability to study majority rule outcomes,
both theoretically and empirically. To our knowledge, this is also the ﬁrst
full-ﬂedged statistical framework for the investigation of classical social
choice concepts such as, in this book, majority rule decision making. At
a practical level, this book provides tools that can be applied to a variety
of real world data sets in order to address a range of important issues.
6 Majority Preference Misestimation. There is, however, one aspect of
our approach and ﬁndings that raises an important caveat about the pro-
cesses of democracy. We argue that one must think of ballot casting and
counting as noisy processes, which correctly record a given voter’s current
preference with probability less than one.9 “Preference misestimations”
(by which we mean erroneous estimates of the population majority pref-
erence) can also arise in estimating preferences from incomplete voting
or survey sample data.10 While we are not the ﬁrst to note these issues,
9 Also, we can think of the choices of individual voters (e.g., whether or not to vote,
and, if to vote, whom to vote for) as nondeterministic (i.e., probabilistic) processes. Fur-
thermore, we believe that many voters experience uncertainty about candidates’ utilities
and/or their own preferences, and thus the ‘correct’ preference of a voter may have to be
conceptualized either as a statistic of a probability distribution over possible preference
states, or as being a random draw from such a distribution.
10 Note that the term “preference misestimation,” as we use it, should not be confused
with either strategic misrepresentation of preferences, as used in game theory, or with
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we are the ﬁrst to suggest, and empirically illustrate, that preference mis-
estimations may pose a far greater threat to democratic decision making
than majority cycles. Our analytic results show how to precisely assess
both the likelihood of cycles and of majority preference misestimations
using real-world data for which voter preferences between any pair of
alternatives are known or can be estimated.
In illustration of these latter points, consider the uncertainties of the
2000 United States presidential election that transﬁxed America and the
world from election day in November until early December 2000. In
this context, we observe that, clearly, nobody was ever concerned about
the possibility of a majority cycle among Bush, Gore, and Nader in that
election. “Who won Florida?”, “Who won the majority of the electoral
college votes?” were the questions. The issue was whether or not the out-
come of the election might ‘accidentally’ misestimate the electorate’s ‘true’
preferences by reversing the top two choices. Hence, the central questions
regarding that election concern accuracy of the assessment of majority
preferences. With only two strong candidates, the possible occurrence of
majority cycles was simply not an issue.11
summary
Throughout the book, we assume that the set of candidates/options/
alternatives, that voters/survey respondents rate/rank/choose from, is
ﬁnite.12 We begin each chapter with a chapter summary, which we keep
as informal and as nonmathematical as possible. In principle, each chap-
ter can be read independently of the others. Whenever material from an-
other chapter plays a critical role, we refer back to the chapter (deﬁnition,
Althaus’ (1998, 2003) misrepresentation of public opinion due to “information effects.”
According to Althaus, the uneven social distribution of political knowledge in mass
publics may distort the assessment of collective opinion in surveys.
11 This is the concern which underlies the statutes mandating election recounts in various
American states whenever the winning candidate’s margin of victory falls below some
speciﬁed threshold.
12 Scholars interested in cycles have also studied what happens when the alternatives can
be thought of as points in an n-dimensional space, giving us an inﬁnite set of possible
alternatives. The key result is that, in two or more dimensions, we can expect that the
entire space of alternatives will be in a majority rule cycle (McKelvey, 1976, 1979). How-
ever, if we impose some constraints, e.g., voting one issue dimension at a time (Shepsle
and Weingast, 1981) or ruling out pairwise votes involving alternatives that are highly
similar to one another, or setting limits on how many alternatives may be considered
(Feld and Grofman, 1996; Feld et al., 1989; Miller et al., 1989), we can avoid cycling
(always, in the ﬁrst case; almost always in the second and third cases).
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